Thoughts on parashat Vayikra.
There is a common view that forgiveness in Judaism is conditional and that there is no forgiveness without repairing the damage done by a wrongdoer. Broadly speaking this view is true, however there are some important nuances here. In the Tanakh forgiveness, as such, is inextricably tied to the concept of sin which is, in its oldest biblical strata, seen as a malefic force that adheres to the sinner and that forgiveness is the divine means for removing it. This is demonstrated by the vocabulary of forgiveness which, in the main, stems from the cultic terminology of cleansing, e.g., tiher (“purify”; Jer. 33:8); mahah (“wipe”; Isa. 43:25); kibbes, rahatz (“wash”; Isa. 1:16; Ps. 51:4,9); kipper (“purge”; Ezek. 16:63: Ps. 78:38). Even the most common verb for forgiveness, salah, probably derives from the Mesopotamian cult where it connotes sprinkling in purification rites.
However, over time a very important distinction emerged in this matter, namely, between the Divine forgiveness and human forgiveness. God’s forgiveness encompasses only those sins which man commits directly against Him, “bein adam la-Makom”. This kind of forgiveness basically does not require “repairing the damage” (at least in its literal understanding: what kind of damage can we do to God?) and it is extensive: this idea is more picturesquely expressed in the talmudic image of God praying to Himself that His mercy should prevail over His anger and that He should deal with His children lifnim mishurat ha’din, namely, that He should forgive them even though strict justice would demand their punishment (Talmud Berachot 7a). However, the human forgiveness, for the sins between a man and his fellow, “bein adam le’havero”, are not forgiven until the injured party has himself forgiven the perpetrator and they fundamentally require repairing the damage or an alternative form of compensation. This topic is addressed in our portion of Torah for this week:
When a person sins and commits a trespass against יהוה – by dealing deceitfully with another in the matter of a deposit or a pledge, or through robbery, or by defrauding another, or by finding something lost and lying about it; if one swears falsely regarding any one of the various things that someone may do and sin thereby – when one has thus sinned and, realizing guilt, would restore either that which was gotten through robbery or fraud, or the entrusted deposit, or the lost thing that was found, or anything else about which one swore falsely, that person shall repay the principal amount and add a fifth part to it. One shall pay it to its owner upon realizing guilt. Then that person shall bring to the priest, as a penalty to יהוה, a ram without blemish from the flock, or the equivalent, as a guilt offering. The priest shall make expiation before יהוה on behalf of that person, who shall be forgiven for whatever was done to draw blame thereby. (Leviticus 5:21-26)
What we learn from the quoted passage is that the distinction between the Divine and the human forgiveness is not sharp (it is not a logical disjunction): every sin done against another human being is a sin against God and God, being the ultimate judge of everything, is present in every human act of forgiveness. That’s why we need Yom Kippur, where the Divine forgiveness plays a central and an ultimate role – our acts of forgiveness need to be sealed by God Himself.
We also learn that every damage done by the wrongdoer needs to be repaired before the act of forgiveness can take place. But what about situations where the harm that was done is difficult to estimate and the compensation is not quantifiable, such as in the case of lies, false testimony (as mentioned in the quoted Torah passage), or other forms of malicious use of language, like damaging someone’s reputation? Are there any objective principles in the matter of forgiveness to be applied here?
The Rabbis cover this topic extensively, often comparing sins done by tongue to the worst, unforgivable sins: “If a man put his neighbor to shame, it is as if he shed blood” (Talmud Bava Metzia 58b), or: “There are three transgressions which call forth retribution from the man who perpetrates in this world, and disinherit him from a share in the world to come. They are: idolatry, adultery, and bloodshed; but the evil tongue outweighs them all” (Arakin, 16b). […] And, again, the wise men said: “The evil tongue kills three persons, the one who speaks it, the one of whom it is spoken, and the one who receives it”. (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Deot 7:3). However, as far as I know, there is no principle of “repairing the damage” in situations like these. It is probably so because the damage done by words may be small and irrelevant in some cases and irreversible and irreparable in other cases (like in the famous story about torn pillows and feathers blown by the wind).
Therefore, in the absence of clear principles regarding compensation and forgiveness, we have to judge matters of this kind ourselves. The general rules of repentance, like distancing from sin, changing behavior and (public) confession still apply. If the damage is relatively minor, if we know that the person feels sorry and the harm done with words was not willful – we can let it go and forgive unconditionally because it is clearly up to us to judge the situation. But in more serious cases of verbal abuse, a victim may absolutely demand responsibility and (reasonable) compensation for it: by not doing so we often “invite” greater harm. In any case, in situations like that we can perform imitatio dei: Just as it is in the nature of God to be merciful to His creatures, so man in attempting to imitate the ways of God should be forgiving toward those who have injured him (Talmud Shabbat 133b). Rabbi Nachman says the following:
Imitate God by being compassionate and forgiving. He will in turn have compassion on you, and pardon your offenses.
Shabbat shalom!
